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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRETT W.

NELSON,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No.

17 ,667

vs.
JEFF JACOBSEN,
Defendant and
Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE .Qf'. THE

~

Plaintiff brought this action at law to recover money
damages against defendant for

alienating the affections of his

former wife.

DISPOSITION 11:!. THE LOWER COURT
The matter
Tibbs,

was

District Judge,

tried to the Court,

on January 21,

1981.

Honorable Don

v.

Defendant was not

represented by counsel at trial. The trial resulted in a judgment
against
retained

defendant
counsel

totalling
and moved

Thereafter,

$84,600.00.

for

a

new

trial

n.o.v., both of which motions were denied.

and

for

defendant
judgment

Defendant then filed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 1 -

this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

Plaintiff

married July 15, 1978.

and

Brenda

(Tr.

18).

Plaintiff was 21 years of age
(Tr.

(Tr.

Nelson
At

(now

Jacobsen)

were

the time in question the

21),

and Brenda was age 18

20).

In October
became

acquainted

of

with

the

same year,

the

Defendant

Plaintiff
who

had

and

been

his wife
previously

married, but was now divorced, and who, at age 31, was somewhat
older

than

the

Plaintiff

and

Brenda

(defendant's

deposition,

pages 3-6) •
The first

untoward contact between

Plaintiff's wife occurred
Eve,

1978,

at a

the Defendant and

some few months later

party held at Defendant's

on New Year's

residence,

at which

time Defendant claimed that Plaintiff's wife approached him and
said she wanted to go to bed with him (defendant's deposition p.
9) .1

The Defendant's next contact with Plaintiff's wife was
approximately
approximately l

one

week

later

at

the

o'clock in the morning.

Defendant's

house

at

The contact lasted for

about an hour and a half (defendant's deposition, page 10).

1

At trial Defendant initially denied this contact, but after being
shown his sworn testimony in the deposition, he acknowledged its accuracy.
Because of such denials and inconsistencies with his former testimony,
the Court ordered publication of the Defendant's deposition, and it is
now before the Court (Tr. 71). It should further be noted that Plaintiff's
fonner wife, Brenda, denied the incident, though at the time of trial she
was married to Defendant, their rrarriage having been contracted on October
1, 1980 (Tr. 76).
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Defendant

testified

in

his

deposition

of

several

late-night meetings at his home with plaintiff's ex-wife:

Q. Was the next contact after that
when you [meaning defendant and plaintiff's
ex-wife] were alone?
A. Probably my house again.
Q.
Night?
A. I don't know. l..t depends on
probably what hours Brett was working, I
would imagine.
(deposition p. 14 lines 20 - 25)
Q.
Most of them [meetings between
defendant and Brendal would have been -A. In the hour and a half bracket,
you are right.
Q. And around the midnight area and
1:00 o'clock?
A. I say fifty fifty, you know, it
was either noon or midnight, one of the two.
Q. Depending
on
when
he
was
working?
A. Yes.
(defendant's deposition p. 15 lines
15 - 25)
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant then went on to testify that there had been
approximately twenty of these types of visits, plus two times he
had gone to Brenda's house,
truck.

plus some rides around town in her

(defendant's deposition p.
Plaintiff

first

learned

18).
of

the

contacts

between his

wife and the Defendant during the early part of June of 1979,
when after

sustaining an injury at the coal mine,

he came home

early from work, and found his wife and the Defendant sitting on
a porch outside of his residence.

The time was between 11:30 and
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I ~

12:30 at night.
going on,

(Tr.

19 and 20).

and after

being

Plaintiff was not sure what was

assured by his wife

nothing, he "let the matter slide" (Tr.

20).

that there was

Shortly thereafter,

Plaintiff again came home early from work and found his wife not
home. Sometime later Plaintiff's wife arrived with the Defendant,
who had taken her to one of
21>.

the nearby mountain canyons.

The incident resulted in a

family session,

involving the

Plaintiff, his wife Brenda, and both of their parents.
Brenda, now Mrs.
Mr.

Jacobsen,

(Tr.

(Tr.

21).

Jacobsen, denied that the subject of her seeing

the Defendant,

was discussed at all.

(Tr.

103).

However, even Brenda's father, who was called by the Defendant as
a

witness,

testified

on

cross-examination

subject of the conversation.

(Tr.

that

that

was

the

118).

These two incidents in June brought matters to a head
and Plaintiff's father contacted Defendant and requested that he
leave Brenda alone to see if they couldn't make their marriage
work.

(Tr.

53).

Defendant acknowledged that plaintiff's father

contacted him on two occasions requesting that he leave Brenda
alone (defendant's depostion p. 32 line 34 and Tr. 77). Defendant
advised plaintiff's

father

as

follows:

"I'll

pick my

friends,

thank you" (defendant's deposition p.

34 lines 21-22).

Regarding

a

(Ferrell Wynn),

concerning

conversation with Brenda's father

the same subject, defendant testified:
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tell
her?

(by Mr. Hciff): Did you ever
that you would never quit seeing

Q.

him

A. At one conversation I believe
something was mentioned that if -- I can't
remember how it went exactly, something about
and I said, "I'll be Brenda's friend as long
as she wants me to be her friend. I'll be
it," and that's about the way that went down.
(Defendant's deposition, page 29 lines 5-12).
During the weeks that followed, defendant continued to
see plaintiff's wife, and in August took her to Las Vegas on an
overnight trip (defendant's deposition page 19, Tr.

23 and 77).

The trip had been arranged in a late night/early morning phone
call

between

defendant

and

plaintiff's

wife,

which

was

interrupted when plaintiff came home sometime after midnight (Tr.
23 and 24).

Defendant asserted that plaintiff had consented to

this trip (Tr.

13).

Plaintiff described his consent as follows:

A. I actually never consented, came
out and gave my full consent that it was O.K.
for her to go because actually in my mind, it
wasn't O.K. for her to go but she would have
went whether I said yes or no. (Tr. 24 lines
29-30 to Tr. 25 lines 1-2).
A. I consented in the idea that it
would, more or less, help us out because she
said she wanted to go to Vegas so she could
get her head on straight and trying to
straighten herself out, so we might be able
to get back together. (Tr. page 26 lines
24-28).
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A. I
told
her
I
wished
she
wouldn't, but if tfat is what she had to do,
that was her will.
Al though

defendant

claims

to

have

done

nothing

improper, he did not ask plaintiff's permission nor did he give
plaintiff notice of the trip (defendant's deposition page 20 line
21).

At first, defendant testified that plaintiff's wife got her

own room (defendant's deposition page 20), but later acknowledged
that he handled the registration under his own name (defendant's
deposition page 22).

With regard to what happened in the room,

defendant testified:

I just opened the door, walked in
and looked around and saw that everything was
cool for her, she went in to bed and I went
back to gambling (defendant's deposition page
23 lines 16-18).
Plaintiff's ex-wife had ostensibly gone to Las Vegas to
be

alone

and

defendant's

to

consider

testimony

that

her

problems,

she

was

yet

gambling

it

appears
with

from

him

apparently intended to continue doing that until her luck

2

Plaintiff's consent, i f it may be called such, must be gauged in
light of the fact that Defendant was his "friend" and had actually undertaken to counsel him regarding his marital affairs (Tr. 14). In addition,
the age difference between Plaintiff (21), and his wife ( 18), and the
Defendant (31) nay have had the inpact of disarming Plaintiff and causing
him to place trust where it was rot properly lodged. His limited exposure
and experience may have made him a poor match for Defendant in a contest
for his wife's affections.
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and

changed and she won sufficient money to pay for

the motel room

(defendant's deposition page 25). Defendant's testimony about the
motel

was

elusive.

He

testified

that

he

had

no

receipts,

no

evidence of any kind that would indicate what the motel was, that
he didn't known where it was, how big it was, or anything about
it,

and

that

he

"couldn't

find

it

in

a

million

the

subject

years"

(defendant's deposition page 26).
Shortly

after

the

Vegas

trip,

of

the

defendant's involvement arose in a conversation between plaintiff
and his ex-wife.

Plaintiff wanted "to find out exactly what kind

of relationship they actually had together" (Tr. 27 lines 10-11).
Concerning this conversation plaintiff testified:

A. That's when she told me not to
ask her anything that I didn't want to hear
and I asked her how many times she'd been
with him, how much involvement and activity
she actually had with him, sexually Csicl
involvement. I asked her about that and I
finally got her down to ten or twelve times
(Tr. page 27 lines 16-21).
The

foregoing

disclosure

triggered

a

confrontation

between plaintiff and his wife, which resulted in her requesting
that she be taken to the defendant's house.

Plaintiff declined

and so his wife went to defendant's on her own (Tr.

27).
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Following

the

June

involvement

markedly.

According to plaintiff's father,

(Tr.

58).

the

by

ex-wife's

quadrupled (Tr.

with

discovery

defendant,

plaintiff

of

his

changed

life

his

his alcohol problem

Where he had had stable employment before

54), he went through four employers in a relatively short

period of time (Tr.

30).

His income between June of 1978 and the

trial in January of 1980 was only half of what is was before (Tr.
31). Termination of his theretofore productive employment came in
July

following

the

June

discovery,

and

was

directly

related

thereto (Tr. 25 and 61). His income before had been $2,500.00 per
month (Tr. 25). The court awarded plaintiff $600.00 per month for
sixteen months following the alienation (Tr.
July,
Nelson marriage.
stayed with

129).

August and September were rocky months for

During this period of time, plaintiff's ex-wife

defendant at his home

During one such visit,

on more

than

one

occasion.

her girlfriend Linda Springer

(who also

appeared as a witness), brought her some clothing
122).

the

(Tr.

109 and

The Vegas trip took place during this period of time.
In September, plaintiff filed an action for divorce and

also filed the instant action,

claiming that the defendant had

alienated the affections of his wife.

Around the end of October

the parties had a fight, after which the plaintiff's ex-wife went
to the defendant's house and thence to her parents and did not

- 8 -
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return.

Plaintiff and his ex-wife each described his or her role

in the fight as being a defensive one.

Plaintiff testified:

A. She attacked me and I tried to
push her away. She'd just keep coming back. I
slapped her with the palm of my hand.
Q.
Cby Mr. Jacobsen) You slapped
her; is that righ?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you push her against the
wall?
A. I pushed her to try to keep her
away from me, yes (Tr. 46 lines 17-24).
Plaintiff's ex-wife described her role as follows:

Q.
Cby
Mr. Mciffl
Do
you
acknowledge tht you kicked Brett and you
scratched
and
you
bit
him
and
fully
participated in that?
A. Yes, I am. I know I scratched
him and I kicked him, but that was my only
defense that I had against him. He's ten
times stronger than I am and I am aware that
I did that, but I did not bite him. I don't
remember biting him, but I did scratch him,
yes, I did (Tr. 110 lines 21-28).

A decree of divorce was filed between the Nelsons on
November 1, 1979, and became final three months thereafter.

The

decree notwithstanding, plaintiff continued to feel affection for
his wife,

and continued to explore with her the possibility of

reconciliation before expiration of the interlocutory period and
remarriage

thereafter.

That

continued

until

approximately
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one

week before plaintiff's ex-wife became the wife of the defendant
(Tr.

30).

plaintiff

Plaintiff's
approximately

defendant (Tr.
The
court

ex-wife
a

acknowledged

week

before

this

her

overture from

marriage

to

the

before

the

144).

The

112).
alienation

in January,

of

March,

affection

matter

came

May and July of 1980

(Tr.

proceedings had gone through the point of pretrial, during all of
which time defendant was represented by counsel.
During
reached a

the

summer

of

1980

settlement agreement in the

settlement documents,

plaintiff

and

defendant

instant matter,

and the

including a motion and order of dismissal

and a promissory note, were forwarded to defendant's counsel. The
stipulated order

of

dismissal was executed August

filed August 12,

1980.

However,

defendant's

9,

counsel

1980 and
failed to

obtain execution of the promissory note by his client,
nullifying the settlement.

CR.

thereby

15) •

After having succeeded in obtaining a dismissal of the
alienation of affection suit, and before any effort to reinstate
the action had been made, defendant, on October 1, 1980, in Las
Vegas,

Nevada,

married plaintiff's ex-wife,

Brenda Nelson

(Tr.

76) •

On December 26, 1980, and in order to revive the case.
plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate the action and set it for

- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial.

CR.

14).

The motion was noticed for January 7, 1981, and

copies of all proceedings were mailed to defendant.

CR.

19).

The motions were called up for hearing by the Court on
January 7, 1981.

Defendant was present in the courtroom when the

Court ordered the reinstatement and set the matter for trial on
January 21, 1981.

CR.

20 and 64).

The Court's order

of

reinstatement and order

setting

the matter for trial were reduced to writing on January 14, 1981
and copies thereof were mailed to defendant on January 15, 1981.
CR.

14 and 15).

In addition,

the Court's executive clerk sent

notice of the trial date to defendant, and called him personally
on the telephone advising him that the trial was going forward,
that

he

should

retain

an

represented by an attorney.

attorney,
CR.

64).

intended to represent himself.

CR.

and

that

plaintiff

was

Defendant replied that he

64).

Defendant appeared at the time and place set for trial.
After

an

inquiry by the Court,

willingness to proceed
The

trial

plaintiff's witnesses,
testified personally,

I1.IQ

se.

he
(Tr.

proceeded.
called

and

indicated his readiness and
6 and 7).
Defendant
examined

and argued his case.

his

cross-examined
own witnesses,

The Court found the

evidence against him and entered judgment.
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Defendant retained new counsel and moved the Court for
a

new trial and for

denied.

judment n.o.v.,

both of which motions were

Defendant filed objections to the Court's order denying

the motions. All of defendant's objections were disallowed except
one, and the Court modified its order accordingly. Defendant then
filed this appeal.

ARGUMENT

POINT I: AN ACTION AT LAW FOR ALIENATION OF
AFFECTIONS IS VIABLE UNDER THE COMMON LAW OF
THIS STATE AND SHOULD NOT BE ABOLISHED.
Defendant's assertion that the State of Utah no longer
recognizes the tort of alienation of affections is simply without
foundation

in

legal

precedent.

To

the

contrary,

Utah

clearly

appears to be one state which continues to recognize this tort.
The Utah Court has recognized the right to recover for
alienation of affection, Wils9n y_._ Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267
P2d

759

CUtah 1954)

and

for

criminal

conversation,

Cahoon

~

Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P2d 94 (Utah 1959).
A useful discussion of the topic appears in an article
in the Utah Bar Journal, in which the author states:

Considering the emphasis that has been placed
- 12 -
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on
marriage
in
Utah
by
political
and
religious
leaders,
there
have
been
surprisingly few actions brought to seek
redres~ for loss of consortium occasioned by
an
interference
with
the
marital
relationship.
But our
society encourages marriage and
regulates it -- should it not also come to
the aid of the marriage partners when the
relationship is soured by the interference of
a third party? "Tortious Interference with
Marital Relations in Utah",
5 filiill Bar
Journal 75 {Fall/Winter 1977 Edition).
Defendant's brief quotes at length from a North Dakota
Law

Review

article

which

is

replete

with

assumptions,

conclusions, and reasoning which the undersigned considers to be
fundamentally

in error and grossly deficient in respect of the

importance of the marriage contract, the rights of the respective
parties

therein,

and

the entitlement of marital parties to be

free from intentional interference by third persons.
Obviously
quoted

accurately

position.
deference
philosophy

In

the

due

the
from
final

authorities
many

ingrained

in

split.

jurisdictions

analysis

established

are

Utah
our

the

issue

precedent

society.

As

Appellant

which

support

and

experience

demonstrate

his

may

rest

on

and

the

marital

perceived

by

undersigned, that philosophy is as follows:

Reason

has

that

a

- 13 -
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the

the

marriage involving a husband and wife as
partr:ers secures to each not only material
services, but love, felicity, companionship,
the exchange of ideas, consultation with
respect to the family welfare and the rearing
of children,
and the maintenance of an
intimacy abounding in reciprocal acts of
kindness. Alberty_._ McGrath, 278 F.2d 16, 18,
(D.C.

Cir.

1960).

Our society could not insure that all marriages enjoy
perfect harmony, for that is rarely, if ever possible, and is not
the

business

of

the

state

to enforce.

The marriage,

however,

should be protected from interference by third parties, so that
the marriage partners have the opportunity to work toward a state
of

harmony

that will

secure

to

each

the

substantial

benefits

thereof. The action need not be based on the anachronism that the
wife

is the husband's chattel but

rather on the fact

that the

marriage secures to each certain substantial benefits worthy of
protection from intentional interference from third persons.

The

benefits to be derived from marriage as well as the damage which
can be inflicted by an interloper have not appreciably changed
since Wilson y_._ Oldroyd,

.§.1!.l2lil.,

and the interest of the law in

protecting the marriage remains as valid as ever.
Recovery

is allowed even though

the offending spouse

willingly participates in the defendant's proscribed conduct, and
even if there has been enticement of defendant by the off ending
spouse.

Wilson y_._ Oldroyd,

~'

267 P2d at 763.

In this case.
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the

evidence

shows

that

Brenda

Nelson

willingly participated with defendant.

(the

offending

spouse)

Even if she had enticed

him, recovery would still be proper.
Punitive damages can be awarded only where there is a
finding of malice.

Evidence that defendant continued to pursue

plaintiff's wife after being warned to desist supports a finding
of wilful!

and wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights so as to

justify an award of punitive damages.

Wilson y_._

Oldroyd, fil!.mr

267 P2d at 764.

POINT II: THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
The applicable rule of judicial review in this kind of
case was set forth
case of Charlton vs.

by Justice Crockett in the frequently cited
Hackett, 11 U2d 389, 360 P2d 176 (1961), in

which the court stated:

In considering the attack on the findings and
judgment of the trial court it is our .duty to
follow these cardinal rules or review: to
indulge them a presumption of validity and
correctness; to require the appellant _to
sustain a burden of showing error; to review
the record in the light most favorable to
them· and not to disturb them if they find
substantial support in the evidence.
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As

one might

full of contradictions.
fix

the

blame

for

expect,

the

testimony

in the

trial

was

The defendant and his new wife sought to

marital

difficulties

on

the

plaintiff,

and

described their pre-existing relationship as being "platonic". In
fact,

"platonic" became the most over-used word in the trial, as

defendant,

his

new wife,

and her

girlfriend all

described the

developing relationship between defendant and plaintiff's ex-wife
by use of this term. The court could well have concluded that the
defendant had "coached" the testimony.
An effort was made to blame the problem on plaintiff's
use

of

alcohol,

but

plaintiff's

ex-wife

acknowledged

that

she

also used alcohol, and the evidence revealed that plaintiff's use
was four times worse following the June discovery of the problem
between his wife and the defendant.
and problems of

which

all

testified,

The serious confrontations
for

the most

part

arose

following the June discovery. With respect to the impact this had
on the plaintiff, his ex-wife's father testified as follows:

Q.
Cby Mr. Mciff) All the problems
with her leaving and coming and going and his
employment and all those things happened
after you were ma:~~ aware of Mr. Jacobsen's
involvement?
A. Yes (Tr. 119 lines 8-12).
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Perhaps

the

most

that

can

be

said

in

response

to

appellant's questioning the sufficiency of the evidence is that
the trial

judge was there and listened to all the witnesses.

He

observed the defendant and his new wife attempt to characterize
their

relationship,

being "platonic".

the midnight meetings and the Vegas trip as

He listened to the plaintiff, his parents, his

ex-wife's father, and Brenda's girlfriend, and concluded that the
relationship was much more than defendant acknowledged and that
it

was

intentional

and

resulted

affections of plaintiff's wife.

in

the

alienation

of

the

In his deposition, defendant had

indicated that any kisses between him and plaintiff's wife would
not have been "passionate" (defendant's deposition page 19).
judge

concluded

otherwise,

and

did

so

with

the

advantage

The
of

having all of the parties before him.
Appellant has suggested the adoption of what he refers
to as the Kansas standard
499

P2d 1063

since

the

required

(1972)).

only

two

(see Long

That case
persons

who

~

Fischer,

imposes
could

an

210 Kansas 21,

impossible burden,

really

establish

the

ingredients would be the interloper and the estranged

spouse (in this case, the defendant and his new wife).
under
alienation,
lost his

the

Kansas

standard,

the

more

successful

the

the more impossible the burden on the party who has

spouse.

If

the

interloper has been successful to the
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point of total

alienation and marriage of plaintiff's wife,

he

will have successfully defeated any opportunity to show that the
estranged

wife

was

not

a

standard would require.

willing

participant,

as

the

Kansas

This standard would constitute almost a

total departure from that set forth by this court in Wilson y_,_
0 l d ro yd , .fil!fil:..S.
The
substantial

findings

support

in

and

judgment

of

the

the

record when

such

trial

court

is viewed

in

find
the

light most favorable to those findings and judgment.

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT HEARD THE EVIDENCE
AND ENTERED JUDGMENT THEREON; UNLESS THE
AWARD WAS BASED ON PASSION OR PREJUDICE. THE
MATTER SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED, REVERSED OR
MODIFIED ON APPEAL.
It is interesting to note that the lower court awards
of compensatory and punitive damages in Wilson y_,_ Oldroyd,

~,

although set by a jury, were identical to the awards made by the
trial judge in this case.

In the Wilson case the Court said:

If the [award] •
• is so grossly excessive
that it must have been inspired by passion or
prejudice, or by spite, envy, ill will or
corruption, as contrasted with reason and
justice, the [award) cannot be permitted to
stand. 267 P2d at 764.
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The
approximates

only

statement

passion is at Tr.

by

the

trial

court

which

124 lines 2 to 17, where Judge

Tibbs, in announcing his judgment, said:

The Court finds that marriage and family -that marriage is a sacred institution and
that anyone who interferes with that should
suffer the full consequences of the law and
I'm just telling you, Mr. Jacobsen, at this
time that this Court nearly every week is
having criminal trials where people steal
money from other people and in my opinion
you've stolen something far more than money,
you have interfered with the whole basis
fabric of society and, when you tell me it's
a plutonic relationship, I say it's nonsense.
I don't buy it at all and I don't want you to
think I do. I don't know how they're going to
collect any money judgments that I give
against you but they' re certainly going to
get one against you and I hope this gets well
publicized because I'd like everyone to know
that if a case like this comes into my Court,
that they can expect to suffer; • • • •
The unambigous import of Judge Tibbs' comments do show
a

passionate

regard for

life in our society.
envy,

ill will or

the

importance

of marriage

and family

There is no indication of prejudice, spite,

corruption toward this defendant, except that

he was the cause of the ruin of a marriage.
In regard to the dollar amount of the award, our Court
has said:

- 19 -
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The jury [in this case, the judge] is allowed
great latitude
in assessing damages
for
personal injuries.
The present cost of
living and the dimished purchasing power of
the dollar may be taken into consideration
when estimating damages.
• • • (T)he mere fact that it [the verdict]
was more than another jury, or more than this
court, might have given, or even more than
the evidence justified, does not conclusively
show that it was the result of passion,
prejudice or corruption. Pauly y_,_ McCarthy,
109 Utah 431, 184 P2d 123, 127 Cl947).
The Wilson
damages

to

$25,000.00
comments

stand,
to

in

court

but

reduced the

$5,000.00.

Pauly y_,_

allowed

In

light

McCarthy,

the

award

for

compensatory

punitive damages
of

supra,

Chief

award from

Justice

regarding

the

Wolfe's
dimished

purchasing power of the dollar, it seems particularly appropriate
that the damage awards in this case be affirmed.

POINT IV: THE RECORD SHOWS THAT DEFENDANT
VOLUNTARILY
AND
ADEQUATELY
REPRESENTED
HIMSELF AT TRIAL; THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ALLOW A
NEW TRIAL.
Defendant claims that a new trial should be granted for
two

reasons.

notice

and

a

He claims first

that

he was

not afforded

i:easonable opportunity to be heard,

and,

that the pretrial procedure was fundamentally unfair.
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timely
second,

Defendant's

position

is

premised

on

the

faulty

allegation that he first learned on January 19, 1981 of the trial
scheduled for January 21, 1981, and that he had no opportunity to
obtain other counsel.
The facts are that Defendant knew from mid-summer, 1980
that he had reneged on the settlement agreement reached, and that
the lawsuit had been dismissed in reliance on that agreement.

In

the face of that, defendant did nothing, seeking thereby to take
advantage of a dismissal premised on what amounted to a fraud.
Thereafter,
case

reinstated

and

the first order of business was to get the
set

down

for

trial.

Plaintiff's

acheive that result is not open to question.

right

to

The reinstatement

occurred on January 7, 1981, two weeks prior to trial and in the
presence of and with the full knowledge of defendant.
Defendant

asserts

that

plaintiff

should

have

sent

notice to defendant to obtain counsel or proceed without counsel
pursuant

to

the

requirements

of

Sec.

78-51-36,

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, which provides that such notice is required when
"an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to act as
such."
Defendant's attorney did not die, nor was he removed or
suspended,

leaving only

the question as

to

the meaning of

phrase "ceases to act as such."
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the

The phrase
case Van Cott et al.
1918),

in

which

the

in question was defined in the early Utah
y_._

wall,

Court,

53 Utah 282, 17 8 Pac.

quoting

a

Michigan

case,

4 2 CUtah
held

as

follows:

We do not understand this to apply to a case
where a practicing attorney for any reason
declines to go on with a particular case
while still continuing in practice. It might
be made the means of serious mischief if it
could have such a construction. The plain
meaning of the statute is to provide for
cases in which the attorney or solicitor, by
reason of death, disability, or other cause,
has ceased to practice in the court. His
refusal to proceed in a particular case is
not ceasing to "act as such~ attorney or
solicitor; it does not even disconnect him
with
the
case;
for
that
can
only
be
accomplished by consent of the parties or of
the court, or by regular proceedings for
substitution of another. (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court

reached an identical

result in the

case Security Adjustment Bureau, 1n£... y_._ West, 20 Utah 2d 292,
437 P2d 214 (Utah 1968) , in which the Court said:

West urges that the court erred in not
setting aside the default judgment because
Security did not demand that West get new
counsel when his attorney withdrew. This,
under Sec. 78-51-36, Utah Code Annotated
1953. This urgence is not well taken since
there is nothing in the record to indicate
that West withdrawing counsel died,
was
removed or suspended from the practice of
- 22 -
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law. The case of Van Cott v. Wall seems to be
controlling here.
Defendant has
Oil

Company y_._

Hanis,

cited the more recent decision of Utah
565

P2d 1135

(Utah 1977)

in which

the

Court, after citing the statute in question, said:

The foregoing clearly appears to have been
enacted to safeguard a litigant who finds
himself without counsel and prevents further
proceedings until he again has counsel or
chooses to proceed I2LQ .§g. (Emphasis added.)
While the earlier decisions remain good law, the later
decision

suggests

that

the

Court

may

look

beyond

the

strict

language to safeguard a litigant who did not have a reasonable
opportunity

to

obtain

other

counsel

and

had

not

chosen

to

represent himself.
The statute as construed in the earlier
clearly

inapplicable

to

the

case

at

approach suggested by Utah Oil y_._

bar.

Harris,

two cases is

Taking

~,

the

broader

there is still

no procedural problem since the evidence supports the conclusion
that defendant had made the choice to represent himself.
Defendant
notify

defendant

to

furhter
obtain

argues
counsel

that plaintiff's failure
or

proceed without

to

counsel

violated Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the District and
Circuit

Courts

of

the

State

of

Utah.

- 23 -
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two

paragraphs, one of which is identical to Sec.
1953 as amended,

78-51-36, U.C.A.,

and the other of which provides,

in pertinent

part, as follows:

When an attorney withdraws as counsel of
record, written notice of the withdrawal must
be served upon the client of the withdrawing
attorney and upon all other parties not in
default and a certificate of service must be
forthwith filed with the court.
Unlike
jurisdictional

the

statute,

requirement.

the

rules

Rule 14 .4 Cc)

of

do
the

not

impose

a

same Rules of

Practice provides:

(c) Strict compliance with the foregoing
rules may be waived by the court, in its
discretion,
in order to prevent manifest
injustice.
The following quote is illustrative of the purpose of
rules of practice:

(T)here is abundant authority
in
support of the view that rules of court are
but a means to accomplish the ends of
justice, and that the court has the power to
modify, suspend, or rescind its own rules
whenever
justice
requires
it
• • • • 21
C.J.S. Courts Section 178.
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Such a waiver was obviously made by the trial Court in
this

instance,

aware

that

agreement

and is supported by the evidence.

he

had

reneged

on

a

resulted in dismissal

settlement

of

Defendant was

agreement,

the lawsuit

which

(summer, 1980).

Defendant was notified of plaintiff's intention to reinstate the
matter

and

have

it set for

trial

(Motion to Reinstate and for

Trial Setting, dated December 26, 1980, set for hearing January
7,

1981).

withdrew

Sometime
(September

between
9,

the

1980)

time

and

that

defendant's

January

7,

1981,

counsel

defendant

consulted with other counsel, who was not retained. From the time
the action was reinstated and set down for trial, defendant had
adequate

opportunity

to

contact and

retain

other

counsel,

but

elected not to do so. Defendant was present personally on January
7, 1981 when the matter was reinstated and set for trial.
The

court

expressly

found

that

an

additional

from plaintiff to defendant to obtain counsel or proceed

notice
J2I.Q

se

would have served no useful purpose and that defendant had made
the

decision

expressly

to

found

relationship with

represent
that
his

himself

the

CR.

defendant

former

80).
was

The

court

aware

attorney had terminated,

further

that

his

that the

matter was going forward and that he was either obliged to obtain
counsel

or

represent himself.

The

court found that he did the

latter CR. 80). The court expressly found that it would be unjust
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to impose on plaintiff the necessity of a new trial when at the
time of trial there was nothing before the court which would have
indicated that the trial should not go forward (R.
In

retrospect,

defendant may assert

80).

that

he

was

prepared to proceed, but at the time and place fixed for
he announced that he was

representing himself and

not

trial,

that he was

ready to proceed. He cross-examined plaintiff's witnesses, called
and examined his own witnesses, testified himself and argued his
case.

He never at any time said or did anything that the trial

court could have taken to mean anything other than a conscious
decison

to

proceed

se,

Ill.Q

and

this

was

so

notwithstanding

cautions and recommendations from the Court Clerk and the Court
itself.
Defendant's argument states that plaintiff's failure to
provide notice to defendant to obtain counsel or proceed without
counsel

effectively

cut

off

the

trial

Court's

jurisdiction

to

proceed with any part of the case after the date that defendant's
original counsel withdrew.

The Rules of Practice of the District

and Circuit Courts were adopted pursuant to the authority granted
by

the

Rules

Utah Rules
of

Procedure.

of

Practice must
U.R.C.P.

Civil
by

Procedure

(U.R.C.P.

consistent with

the

83),
Rules

82 provides:

-
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and,
of

the

Civil

These Rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state or the venue of actions therein.
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff is in agreement with the basic discussion in
defendant's brief regarding due process and procedural fairness.
Plaintiff's counsel is of the opinion that no response thereto is
required for

the reason that the facts of the case do not give

rise

application of

to the

the concepts discussed.

Reduced to

bare bones, defendant, with adequate notice and caution, chose to
represent himself.

There were no surprises sprung,

no defaults

entered, no declining to afford additional time to prepare or to
obtain counsel, no ungranted requests or petitions, and no abuse
of discretion.

The only thing which defendant requested and did

not receive was a non-suit on plaintiff's complaint. This was not
a

procedural,

but

a

substantive

matter,

based

on

the

trial

court's view of the evidence.
CONCLUSION

The

judgment

of

the

trial

court

should,

in

all

~

respects, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

[~

day of October, 1981.

K~
-

27 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE Q.E SERVICE
I

hereby certify that

two

(2)

full,

true and correct

copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were placed
in the U.S.

Mail, first-class postage thereon fully prepaid,

the /2._Tlf day of October, 1981, addressed as follows:

Mr. Craig M. Snyder
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
Attorneys at Law
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